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Using a sample of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges, this study examines the impact of voluntary corporate social
responsibility (CSR) disclosure on independent audit demand in different insti-
tutional environments. The sample covers the 2008–2016 period and excludes
firms that are required to disclose CSR information. The findings show that
compared with companies that choose to not disclose such information, com-
panies that voluntarily disclose CSR information prefer to employ ‘‘small”
accounting firms for auditing services, although the auditing fees are much
higher. However, as the institutional environment improves, this preference
is weakened. Further analyses show that this preference is stronger in enter-
prises where CSR disclosure is driven by strong political motivations and man-
agerial self-interest motivations. Legitimate motivations and economic
motivations do not significantly impact the preference for ‘‘small” audit firms.
Furthermore, this preference is more obvious in enterprises with poor opera-
tional performance and low information disclosure quality, and it increases
as CSR disclosure level decreases. The study enriches our understanding of
the economic consequences of voluntary CSR disclosure and the factors that
influence independent audit demand. The results also have implications for
the construction and regulation of China’s system for supervising CSR infor-
mation disclosure in the transitional phase.
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Stakeholders have diverse information needs, and as financial information cannot meet all of their decision-
making needs, non-financial information has become increasingly important. Since 2009, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has required that some listed companies to disclose their social responsibility
reports together with their annual reports, while other listed companies can independently decide whether to
disclose their social responsibility reports. According to the Rankins CSR Ratings, the number of listed com-
panies issuing CSR reports increased from 471 in 2009 to 795 in 2016, and the proportion of firms voluntarily
issuing CSR reports increased from 28.03% (132) to 47.55% (378) over the same period. Thus, both the num-
ber of listed companies disclosing their CSR activities and the proportion of firms voluntarily disclosing CSR
activities are increasing. However, CSR disclosure is not uniform, and the content and form of the reports are
largely arbitrary and inconsistent (Shen and Jin, 2006; Quan et al., 2015).
Non-financial information is more difficult to manipulate than financial information, so it is useful for eval-
uating financial information (Dhaliwa et al., 2011). As important participants in the capital market, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) believes that CPAs can use non-financial information as an
independent and effective benchmark for evaluating financial reporting data and can use non-financial data to
improve the detection of fraud. Therefore, non-financial information such as CSR reports has become an
important component of audit risk assessment and risk response (Zhu et al., 2015). Although CSR disclosure
has a ‘‘communication effect”, thus reducing information asymmetry (Li et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2016), empir-
ical evidence shows that CSR disclosure also has a ‘‘cover-up effect”, and can become a managerial tool for
concealing immoral behaviors such as inadequate profitability or other bad news (Koehn and Ueng, 2010;
Quan et al., 2015). In practice, once corporate immoral behavior is discovered or exposed, it will cause serious
adverse consequences, as in the cases of the Sanlu ‘‘poisoned milk powder” incident in 2008, the ‘‘zombie
meat” incident in 2015, the fake Nike ‘‘best basketball shoes” incident in 2017, and so on.
Accordingly, it is important to ask the following questions: how do companies’ CSR disclosure decisions
affect their independent audit demand decisions? when selecting auditors, do they prefer ‘‘big” or ‘‘small”
firms? In addition, due to regional differences in resource endowment, geographical location, and national
policies, there are obvious differences in the institutional environments of Chinese listed companies in China’s
transitional economy (Fan et al., 2011). As a result, companies’ motivation to disclose information and their
capacity to misrepresent their activities are heterogeneous due to different institutional constraints (Cheng
et al., 2011). Therefore, when examining the relationship between voluntary CSR disclosure and audit behav-
iors, enterprises’ institutional environments should be taken into account.
Regulatory factors can obscure companies’ motivation to issue CSR reports; that is, CSR reports that are
part of a company’s mandatory disclosure are not entirely the product of managerial autonomy (Wang et al.,
2014). Therefore, this study uses a sample from the 2008 to 2016 period of A-share listed companies on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges that are not required to issue CSR reports. This allows the study
to investigate the relationship between the voluntary disclosure of CSR information and independent auditing
needs. It asks the following questions: (1) do enterprises that voluntarily disclose CSR reports prefer ‘‘big” or
‘‘small” audit firms, and how much do they pay for auditing services?; and (2) does the institutional environ-
ment affect the demand for independent audits among enterprises that voluntarily disclose CSR information?
The results indicate that enterprises that voluntarily disclose CSR information prefer ‘‘small” audit firms,
which have a higher audit risk and charge higher auditing fees, but a good institutional environment can effec-
tively suppress this preference. Further tests show that the impact of voluntary CSR disclosure on independent
auditing needs varies with disclosure motivations, and that corporate performance and the quality of enter-
prises’ information disclosure influence this relationship. The lower the quality of information disclosure,
the stronger the preference for ‘‘small” firms.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, few studies of the factors that influence the
demand for independent audits have explored the effect of voluntary CSR disclosure. As government super-
vision on CSR is in an important period of system construction and regulation, the study of the relationship
between voluntary CSR disclosure and independent audit demand provides important empirical evidence for
the effects of government supervision in a transition economy. Second, using independent audit needs as an
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and provides a new perspective for understanding how the institutional environment in China affects the
micro-path of audit demand. Third, most studies of CSR disclosure do not distinguish between voluntary
and mandatory disclosure. In fact, these two types of disclosure have quite different motivations. This study
uses a sample that contains only enterprises that can choose whether to make CSR disclosures, which
improves the reliability and pertinence of the research conclusions and provides better guidelines for improv-
ing relevant policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our hypotheses.
Section 3 introduces the research design. Section 4 reports the empirical results and analyses. Section 5 pre-
sents further analyses. Section 6 gives our robustness test. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Literature and hypotheses development
Previous studies of the economic consequences of CSR disclosure focus on earnings management
(Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Chen et al., 2018), capital cost (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013),
tax avoidance (Hoi et al., 2013; Zou, 2018), and so on. Their conclusions are inconsistent. Most studies of
the impact of CSR disclosure on audit behavior consider its effect on audit fees (Zhu et al., 2015; Peter
et al., 2017), and very few consider its relationship with independent audit needs. In fact, auditors have a num-
ber of reasons for paying attention to clients’ CSR disclosures. First, because auditors have a deep under-
standing of their customer’s business environment and financial situation, they are able to evaluate non-
financial information disclosed by the customer. As CSR is an important type of non-financial information,
auditors can obtain additional information through its disclosure, which in turn provides favorable conditions
for audit risk assessment. Second, CSR disclosure tends to attract the attention of external stakeholders (Kong
et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014), thus creating a kind of supervisory pressure on auditors’ behaviors, so auditors
need to consider CSR disclosure in risk assessment procedures. Third, some studies indicate that CSR is used
by managers to pursue their self-interest (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Quan et al., 2015), which can influ-
ence business operation risk and consequently affect the evaluation of audit risk. Based on the above analysis,
this study argues that it is necessary and important to examine the impact of voluntary CSR disclosure on
independent audit needs.
According to principal-agent theory, managers use CSR to enhance their professional reputation and per-
sonal interests, and that this is at the expense of shareholders’ interests. In other words, CSR disclosure has
‘‘cover-up effect.” Hemingway and Maclagan (2004) argue that CSR is used to cover up managers’ earnings
manipulation and other misconduct. Kim et al. (2012) believe that the purpose of CSR disclosure is to create
an apparently transparent social image for enterprises, which allows them to conduct earnings management
behind the screen. Gao et al. (2012) finds that Chinese private enterprises are more likely to make charitable
donations in the hope of covering up or diverting the public’s attention from other improper behaviors such as
the internal lack of social responsibility or the declining reputation of the enterprises. That is to say, the char-
itable donations of Chinese private enterprises are more ‘‘instrumental” and are ‘‘green scarf” rather than ‘‘red
scarf.”
In addition, in the context of China’s special transition economy, the content and language of voluntary
CSR disclosure are often selected to convey positive information about the company’s active fulfillment of
its responsibilities, for very obvious public relations purposes (Song and Gong, 2006). To some extent,
CSR disclosure has become a tool for enterprises to seek rent from the government; that is, it can help enter-
prises obtain rent. Zou (2018) finds that CSR disclosure is negatively related to actual tax burden, and the
relationship is more obvious among enterprises that disclose CSR information voluntarily, suggesting that
enterprises proactively disclose CSR information, while secretly engaging in tax avoidance behaviors. Li
et al. (2016) find that the tendency to make donations and the amount of donations of Chinese private listed
companies are positively related to tax avoidance, which means that there is a phenomenon of ‘‘apparent
donation, but secret tax avoidance” among these companies. As audits are external governance mechanisms,
higher quality audits provide more supervision and more restriction on tax avoidance (Jin and Lei, 2011). The
size of accounting firms is a basic guarantee of high audit quality (De Angelo, 1981). As large accounting firms
have higher professional competence than smaller firms and are more concerned about reputation, litigation
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et al., 2013). Auditors can determine whether an enterprise’s operation risk is increased by negative CSR per-
formance (Koh and Tong, 2013). When auditing a client with high operation risk, big audit firms have the
motivation and ability to increase the number of audit procedures applied to the client’s accounting informa-
tion, thus reducing the audit risk to an acceptable level. However, small audit firms may not have the profes-
sional competence or resources needed to detect false information. In reality, audit committees’ choice of
auditor is usually directed by managers, even directly decided by them (Zhang et al., 2010). Therefore, the
managers of enterprises that have voluntarily disclosed CSR may select small audit firms to avoid unfavorable
auditor supervision, which sends a negative signal to stakeholders. Based on the above analysis, we propose
the following research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Other factors being equal, companies that make voluntarily CSR disclosures are more likely to
select ‘‘small” accounting firms as auditors than companies that do not disclose CSR.
What is the effect of selecting ‘‘small” audit firms on audit fees? Generally, there are three determinants of
audit pricing: normal cost, risk premium, and reputation premium. Compared with ‘‘big” audit firms, ‘‘small”
audit firms do not have a reputation premium. Therefore, assuming that normal audit cost is controlled, audit
risk is the main factor in determining the audit fees of ‘‘small” audit firms. Confucian culture, which occupies a
dominant position in Chinese culture, emphasizes ‘‘wise self-preservation, the doctrine of the mean,” which
creates a universal mentality of ‘‘the less trouble the better” in listed companies, and this leads them to restrict
the disclosure of information. According to Rankins CSR Ratings (RKS), ‘‘reporting before management” is
a common problem among Chinese listed companies. Although the number of enterprises voluntarily disclos-
ing CSR information is increasing, most of the CSR reports have low scores, well below the RKS passing
grade. Furthermore, the content of most CSR reports are merely ‘‘gratifying” summaries, and there are
‘‘clone” CSR reports (Quan et al., 2015). The number of CSR reports assured by third-party authorities is very
small, they are insufficiently independent, and the assurance practice standards are not uniform (Shen et al.,
2011). In practice, enterprises labeled socially responsible have frequently engaged in activities that damaged
social interests and their corporate reputations, for example, Vanke’s ‘‘poisonous floor” case and Tsingtao
Beer’s ‘‘quality gate” case. Thus, the general public lacks confidence in the quality of CSR reports, and ques-
tions the motivations of enterprises that voluntarily disclose CSR information. Zhu et al. (2015) argue that as
an important type of non-financial information, CSR reports can provide auditors with information that is
important for the audit process, and is an important component of audit risk assessment and risk response.
Specifically, when determining audit pricing, auditors may tend to think that voluntary CSR disclosure
enhances audit risk and increases audit efforts, causing an increase in audit costs; thus, they will charge these
audit clients higher audit fees. Based on the above analysis, we propose the following research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Other factors being equal, companies that make voluntary CSR disclosures pay higher audit
fees to employ ‘‘small” accounting firms than with companies that do not disclose CSR information.
Institutional environment is a basic determinant of the behaviors of economic subjects, and enterprise
behaviors are often endogenous within a specific institutional environment. As China’s capital market is a
new and transitional market, there are significant differences in the institutional environments of different
regions, which can cause differences in the motivations for information disclosure, the ability to make false
statements (Cheng et al., 2011), and the corporate governance role of independent auditing. Hence, it can
be reasonably inferred that the preference for ‘‘small” audit firms among enterprises that voluntarily disclose
CSR information may be affected by the local institutional environment. First, as the level of marketization
and legalization is relatively high in areas with good institutional environments, enterprises in these areas are
motivated to provide more transparent and higher quality accounting information to alleviate the agency
problem and strengthen the role of signal transmission (Liu and Wang, 2014); thus, the demand for high-
quality auditing is strong. In contrast, in a bad institutional environment, investors have insufficient legal pro-
tection, and enterprises lack the need for high-quality auditing (Zhang et al., 2012). Second, in an area with
strong legal protections and developed market intermediaries, enterprises’ illegal or immoral behaviors are
more likely to be investigated and exposed, and the subsequent losses are more serious. That is, the costs
and risks of actively disclosing CSR information are greater, which makes the fulfillment of CSR more signif-
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and ‘‘deep pocket” theory, reputation and legal punishment mechanisms are more likely to play a role in good
institutional environments; thus, in these environments, auditors’ concerns for self-reputation and litigation
risk will lead to high audit quality (Chen et al., 2010; Liu and Wang, 2014). Based on the above analysis,
we propose the following research hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Other factors being equal, improving the regional institutional environment can effectively
restrain the preference of enterprises that voluntarily disclose CSR information for ‘‘small” accounting firms.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection and data source
We select all of the A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 2008
and 2016 as our initial sample. China began to implement a policy that is a mixture of mandatory and vol-
untary CSR disclosure in 2009, but as companies disclose their last year’s CSR reports during this year,
2008 is the initial year. Then, we exclude the following observations from the sample: (1) financial companies,
because these companies have special operational characteristics and accounting systems; (2) companies with
abnormal operations such as ST and *ST companies; (3) companies issuing B-shares, H-shares, and other for-
eign shares, because the market price, accounting standards, and regulatory environment of such stocks are
different than those of A-share companies; (4) companies that are required to disclose CSR activities, because
this study examines the differences in independent audit demand between companies that choose to disclose
CSR activities and those that choose not to disclose CSR activities; and (5) any observation with missing data.
The final sample has 13,340 observations, including 1622 observations of voluntary disclosure, and 11,718
observations with no disclosure. The financial data are mainly from the CSMAR database and the CSR report
data are from the RKS database. In addition, to eliminate the interference of outliers on our regression tests,
all of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
3.2. Models and variable definitions
We construct Model (1) to test Hypothesis 1 as follows:Auditori;t ¼ a0 þ a1CSRi;t þ a2Sizei;t þ a3Levi;t þ a4Growthi;t þ a5Revi;t þ a6Invi;t þ a7Curri;t þ a8Roai;t
þ a9Lossi;t þ a10Agei;t þ a11Top1i;t þ a12Seoi;t þ a13Soei;t þ Year þ Industry þ ei;t ð1Þwhere i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. The dependent variable, Auditori,t, is a dummy variable for the
enterprise’s independent audit demand. Following previous studies, this study defines ‘‘big” accounting firms
as firms that are ranked in the top 10 in the ‘‘Information about the Top 100 Ranked Firms in the Compre-
hensive Evaluation of Certified Public Accountants Firms” issued by the Chinese Association of Certified
Public Accountants (CACPA). If an accounting firm employed by company i in year t is ranked in the top
10, Auditor is equal to 0, and otherwise 1. The independent variable CSRi,t indicates whether company i vol-
untarily discloses its CSR report in year t; if yes, the variable is equal to 1, and otherwise 0. Hypothesis 1 pre-
dicts that the regression coefficient a1 of variable CSRi,t will be significantly positive.
We construct Model (2) to test Hypothesis 2 as follows:Infeei;t ¼ a0 þ a1CSRi;t þ a2Auditori;t þ a3CSRi;t  Auditori;t þ a4Sizei;t þ a5Levi;t þ a6Growthi;t
þ a7Revi;t þ a8Invi;t þ a9Curri;t þ a10Roai;t þ a11Lossi;t þ a12Agei;t þ a13Top1i;t þ a14Seoi;t
þ a15Soei;t þ a16Auditopi;t þ a17Sqsubi;t þ Year þ Industry þ ei;t ð2Þ
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selection and audit fees. The independent variable Infeei,t represents audit fee, which is equal to the natural
logarithm of the domestic audit fees paid by enterprise i in year t. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the regression
coefficient a3 of the interaction term CSRi,t  Auditori,t will be significantly positive.
We construct Model (3) to test Hypothesis 3 as follows:Table
Variab
Variab
Audit
Indepe
CSR i
volu
Institu
Firm s
Debt l
Enterp
Receiv
Invent
Liquid
Profita
Opera
Years
Owner
Motiv
fina
Nature
Audit
Numb
Year v
IndustAuditori;t ¼ a0 þ a1CSRi;t þ a2Hmkti;t þ a3CSRi;t  Hmkti;t þ a4Sizei;t þ a5Levi;t þ a6Growthi;t
þ a7Revi;t þ a8Invi;t þ a9Curri;t þ a10Roai;t þ a11Lossi;t þ a12Agei;t þ a13Top1i;t þ a14Seoi;t
þ a15Soei;t þ Year þ Industry þ ei;t ð3ÞModel (3) is a logit regression model, which is used to test whether the relationship between voluntary CSR
disclosure and independent audit demand is affected by differences in regional institutional environments. The
variable Hmkti,t, a dummy variable representing institutional environment, is derived from the ‘‘Marketiza-
tion Index” published by Fan et al. in 2011. As this index only includes data up to 2010, we draw on Yang
et al. (2014) to develop an index for 2011 and later years: for example, the index for 2011 is equal to the index
of 2010 plus the average value added of 2008, 2009, and 2010 (the three previous years). The marketization
indexes for each year in the 2012–2016 period are calculated in an analogous fashion. If the marketization
index of the area where the enterprise is located is larger than the sample median, then Hmkti,t equals 1,
and otherwise 0. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the regression coefficient of the interaction term CSRi,t -
 Hmkt
i,t
will be significantly negative.1
le definitions.
le name Variable
symbol
Variable definitions
fees Infee Natural logarithm of the domestic audit fees paid by the enterprise
ndent audit demand Auditor Equal to 1 if a company employs a ‘‘non-top10” accounting firms for auditing, and
otherwise 0
nformation
ntary disclosing
CSR Equal to 1 if a company discloses its CSR report voluntarily, and otherwise 0
tional environment Hmkt Equal to 1 if the marketization index is larger than the sample median, and otherwise 0.
ize Size Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
evel Lev Ratio of total liabilities to the total assets at end of the year
rise growth ability Growth Annual percentage revenue growth of the firm
able items Rev Ratio of accounts receivable to the total assets at the end of the year
ory items Inv Ratio of inventories to the total assets at the end of the year
ity ratio Curr Ratio of current assets to the current assets at the end of the year
bility Roa Ratio of annual net profit to the total assets at the end of the year
tion loss Loss A dummy variable that equals 1 if the business operates at a loss in the current year, and
otherwise 0.
of listing Age Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years a company has been listed
ship concentration Top1 Shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder at the end of the year
ation of equity
ncing
Seo An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm has the demand of additional shares or rights
issue in the current year, and otherwise 0.
of property rights Soe An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is ultimately controlled by the government,
and otherwise 0.
opinions Auditop Equal to 1 if the firm obtains the standard unqualified audit opinion in that year, and
otherwise 0.
er of subsidiaries Aqsub Square roots of the number of subsidiaries included in the consolidated statements at the
end of the year
ariable Year Dummy variable, controlling the time effect
ry variable Industry Dummy variable, controlling the industry effect. According to the industry classification
standard of the Securities Regulatory Commission in 2012, the manufacturing industry is
classified as a second-level industry, and all of the other industries are classified as first-
level.
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controlled in the models: firm size, debt level, enterprise growth ability, receivable items, inventory items, liq-
uidity ratio, profitability, operation loss, years of listing, ownership concentration, motivation of equity
financing, nature of property rights, audit opinions, and number of subsidiaries.
The definitions of all of the variables are presented in Table 1.4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics, including the means, medians, minimum, maximum, and standard
deviations of the variables. The mean, minimum, and maximum of Infee are 13.343, 12.206, and 14.845 respec-
tively, indicating that the companies paid a range of audit fees. The mean of Auditor is 0.470, suggesting that
more than half of the sample companies employ ‘‘Top 10” accounting firms. The mean of CSR is 0.122, show-
ing that only 12.2% of the sample companies voluntarily disclose their CSR reports, indicating that Chinese
enterprises are generally unwilling to voluntarily engage in CSR disclosure. In Table 3, the variables are
grouped into subsamples of companies that voluntarily disclose their CSR reports and companies that do
not disclose their CSR reports. The means are calculated for each subsample. The results show that the means
of Infee and Auditor for companies that voluntarily disclose their social responsibility reports are significantly
higher than those of companies that do not disclose their social responsibility reports, indicating that compa-
nies that practice voluntarily CSR disclosure are more willing to hire non-top 10 accounting firms to conduct
audits and are willing to pay higher audit fees. The means of most of the control variables are significantly
different between the subsamples.4.2. Correlation analysis
Table 4 lists the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables. The correlation coefficient between Audi-
tor and CSR is 0.042, which is significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting that companies that voluntarily
disclose their CSR reports are more willing to employ ‘‘small” accounting firms than companies that do not
disclose their CSR reports; thus Hypothesis 1 is preliminarily supported. The correlation coefficient between
Infee and CSR is 0.125, which is also significantly positively correlated at the 1% level, indicating that
companies that voluntarily disclose their CSR reports may pay higher audit fees than companies that doTable 2
Descriptive statistics of the variables.
Variable Obs Mean Median Minimum Maximum Sd
Infee 13,340 13.343 13.305 12.206 14.845 0.506
Auditor 13,340 0.470 0 0 1 0.499
CSR 13,340 0.122 0 0 1 0.327
Size 13,340 21.678 21.605 19.436 24.477 1.017
Lev 13,340 0.425 0.416 0.046 0.896 0.213
Growth 13,340 0.223 0.111 0.575 4.679 0.629
Rev 13,340 0.113 0.091 0 0.446 0.100
Inv 13,340 0.159 0.122 0 0.755 0.148
Curr 13,340 2.592 1.646 0.301 20.136 2.996
Roa 13,340 0.038 0.035 0.160 0.191 0.051
Loss 13,340 0.091 0 0 1 0.288
Age 13,340 2.037 2.197 0 3.296 0.773
Top1 13,340 0.346 0.325 0.090 0.751 0.149
Seo 13,340 0.226 0 0 1 0.418
Soe 13,340 0.366 0 0 1 0.482
Sqsub 13,340 2.427 2.236 0 20.149 1.991
Auditop 13,340 0.972 1 0 1 0.164
Table 3
Mean difference tests of the variables.
Variable Mean Mean difference test
CSR = 0 CSR = 1
Infee 13.320 13.540 0.194***
Auditor 0.462 0.526 0.064***
Size 21.614 22.146 0.532***
Lev 0.422 0.446 0.024***
Growth 0.226 0.200 0.026*
Rev 0.115 0.098 0.017***
Inv 0.156 0.182 0.026***
Curr 2.608 2.480 0.128*
Roa 0.038 0.043 0.005***
Loss 0.094 0.070 0.024***
Age 2.025 2.125 0.100***
Top1 0.345 0.358 0.013***
Seo 0.226 0.224 0.002
Soe 0.360 0.412 0.052***
Auditop 0.970 0.991 0.021**
Sqsub 2.387 2.721 0.334***
Note: The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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is generally less than 0.5, which shows that there is no serious multi-collinearity problem in the model.4.3. Multivariate regression analysis
Table 5 reports the results of the analyses of the relationships between voluntary CSR disclosure, institu-
tional environment, and independent audit needs. The regression coefficient of CSR, shown in column (1), is
0.415 and is significantly positive at the 1% level, showing that companies that voluntarily disclose their CSR
reports are more willing to employ ‘‘small” accounting firms than companies that do not disclose their CSR
reports. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. The regression coefficient of the interaction term CSR  Auditor,
shown in column (2), is 0.044 and is significantly positive at the 5% level, suggesting that small accounting
firms employed by the companies that voluntarily disclose their CSR reports charge higher audit fees, perhaps
because small accounting firms believe that auditors’ efforts and audit risk are increased by voluntary CSR
disclosure. The regression results for CSR are given in columns (3) and (4). The former is significantly positive
at the 1% level, and the latter is negative and insignificant. The total regression results given in columns (2) to
(4) support Hypothesis 2. The regression coefficient of CSR is significantly positive at the level of 1%, and the
regression coefficient of the interaction term CSR  Hmkt is significantly negative at the 1% level, indicating
that the preference for small accounting firms expressed by companies that voluntarily disclose their CSR
reports decreases as the regional institutional environment improves. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported.5. Further analysis
5.1. Motivations for CSR disclosure
Since 2009, China has had a policy that combines voluntary CSR disclosure with mandatory CSR disclo-
sure. Scholars have conducted a series of studies on the motivations for CSR disclosure, including legitimacy
motivation, economic motivation, political motivation, and managers’ self-interest motivation, which suggest
the economic consequences of disclosing CSR reports driven by different motivations are different (Branco
and Rodrigues, 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; He et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2014; Zou, 2018; Heminway and
Maclagan, 2004). Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether the influence of voluntary CSR disclosure
Table 4
Pearson correlation coefficient.
Infee Auditor CSR Size Lev Growth Rev Inv Curr Roa Loss Age Top1 Seo Soe Sqsub Auditop
Infee 1
Auditor 0.164*** 1
CSR 0.125*** 0.042*** 1
Size 0.647*** 0.086*** 0.171*** 1
Lev 0.249*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.449*** 1
Growth 0.080*** 0.007** 0.014** 0.086*** 0.060*** 1
Rev 0.012** 0.038*** 0.057*** 0.142*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 1
Inv 0.063*** 0.019** 0.057*** 0.166*** 0.343*** 0.038*** 0.120*** 1
Curr 0.208*** 0.026*** 0.014** 0.280*** 0.621*** 0.043*** 0.008** 0.134*** 1
Roa 0.009** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.381*** 0.179*** 0.046*** 0.117*** 0.237*** 1
Loss 0.022** 0.021** 0.027*** 0.058*** 0.190*** 0.128*** 0.059*** 0.005 0.109*** 0.620*** 1
Age 0.143*** 0.066*** 0.042*** 0.302*** 0.423*** 0.024*** 0.260*** 0.165*** 0.350*** 0.218*** 0.120*** 1
Top1 0.089*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.197*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.016** 0.107*** 0.063*** 0.108*** 1
Seo 0.160*** 0.042*** 0.001 0.125*** 0.074*** 0.179*** 0.084*** 0.011** 0.100*** 0.011** 0.024*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 1
Soe 0.012** 0.052*** 0.036*** 0.230*** 0.297*** 0.045*** 0.178*** 0.025*** 0.223*** 0.147*** 0.079*** 0.417*** 0.151*** 0.094*** 1
Sqsub 0.253*** 0.023*** 0.055*** 0.278*** 0.241*** 0.003 0.065*** 0.120*** 0.183*** 0.034*** 0.008** 0.197*** 0.023*** 0.005 0.128*** 1
Auditop 0.038*** 0.023*** 0.043*** 0.106*** 0.114*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.057*** 0.180*** 0.190*** 0.085*** 0.060*** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.033*** 1
Note: The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Regression results for relationships between voluntary CSR disclosure, institutional environment, and independent audit demand.
Variable Dependent variable
Auditor Infee Auditor
Full sample Auditor = 1 Auditor = 0 Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CSR 0.415*** 0.005 0.058*** 0.003 0.641***
(7.398) (0.315) (4.282) (0.193) (8.292)
Auditor 0.080***
(11.903)
CSR*Auditor 0.044**
(2.241)
Hmkt 0.501***
(11.940)
CSR*Hmkt 0.588***
(5.137)
Size 0.162*** 0.284*** 0.264*** 0.306*** 0.151***
(7.041) (61.683) (40.927) (46.435) (6.473)
Lev 0.131 0.070*** 0.054* 0.104*** 0.028
(0.950) (2.853) (1.663) (2.829) (0.201)
Growth 0.049 0.016*** 0.012 0.020** 0.039
(1.595) (2.824) (1.498) (2.456) (1.262)
Rev 0.238 0.212*** 0.152*** 0.268*** 0.492**
(1.107) (5.867) (2.841) (5.417) (2.282)
Inv 0.224 0.078*** 0.017 0.133*** 0.262
(1.307) (2.772) (0.458) (3.050) (1.513)
Curr 0.010 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.010
(1.301) (8.982) (7.191) (5.698) (1.206)
Roa 1.586*** 0.023 0.041 0.104 1.457***
(3.195) (0.257) (0.346) (0.822) (2.907)
Loss 0.154* 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.157*
(1.911) (4.459) (3.124) (2.957) (1.931)
Age 0.236*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.214***
(7.655) (4.294) (2.859) (2.994) (6.893)
Top1 0.198 0.032 0.018 0.047 0.138
(1.512) (1.435) (0.553) (1.459) (1.041)
Seo 0.016 0.019** 0.013 0.022** 0.032
(0.353) (2.279) (1.091) (2.033) (0.671)
Soe 0.097** 0.127*** 0.114*** 0.148*** 0.184***
(2.141) (16.475) (11.007) (12.707) (3.970)
Auditop 0.126*** 0.190*** 0.052*
(6.140) (6.802) (1.837)
Sqsub 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.066***
(25.612) (17.505) (18.427)
Constant 4.266*** 7.181*** 7.520*** 6.789*** 4.041***
(8.774) (77.758) (58.147) (51.436) (8.242)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,340 13,340 6265 7075 13,340
Wald Chi2/F value 919.89 304.7 134.6 178.9 1113.40
Pseudo R2 /Adjusted R2 0.056 0.522 0.503 0.520 0.069
366 P. Zheng, C. Ren / China Journal of Accounting Research 12 (2019) 357–377on auditor selection varies with the motivation for engaging in CSR disclosure. First, following Zhang et al.
(2014), the legitimacy motivation is explored by using the Senind variable, which represents industry sensitiv-
ity to social responsibility concerns. Companies in safe production sensitive industries, product quality sensi-
tive industries and environmental protection-sensitive industries are classified as having high industry
sensitivity. According to the Securities Regulatory Commission’s 2012 industry classifications, Senind is equal
Table 6
Regression results for the different disclosure motivations.
Variable Dependent variable: Auditor
Senind = 1 Senind = 0 CP = 1 CP = 0 Fseo = 1 Fseo = 0 Soe = 0 Soe = 1 Adm = 1 Adm = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CSR 0.373*** 0.503*** 0.653*** 0.383*** 0.470*** 0.399*** 0.490*** 0.283*** 0.652*** 0.208***
(5.563) (4.790) (4.199) (6.328) (4.071) (6.206) (6.642) (3.231) (7.862) (2.696)
Size 0.168*** 0.150*** 0.305*** 0.139*** 0.153*** 0.165*** 0.135*** 0.207*** 0.230*** 0.113***
(6.021) (3.572) (4.809) (5.563) (3.321) (6.138) (4.401) (5.686) (6.788) (3.284)
Lev 0.205 0.017 1.044*** 0.012 0.266 0.242 0.155 0.217 0.338* 0.156
(1.229) (0.069) (2.877) (0.078) (0.940) (1.498) (0.840) (0.965) (1.743) (0.736)
Growth 0.040 0.068 0.050 0.046 0.014 0.071* 0.043 0.064 0.066 0.028
(1.002) (1.421) (0.480) (1.428) (0.231) (1.955) (1.076) (1.320) (1.403) (0.700)
Rev 0.180 0.348 0.099 0.240 0.411 0.440* 0.953*** 1.018*** 0.534 0.018
(0.685) (0.921) (0.119) (1.075) (0.999) (1.735) (3.612) (2.684) (1.621) (0.061)
Inv 0.188 0.373 0.347 0.199 0.406 0.143 0.334 1.019*** 0.240 0.042
(0.758) (1.483) (0.694) (1.087) (1.181) (0.718) (1.488) (3.642) (0.902) (0.179)
Curr 0.020** 0.014 0.048*** 0.003 0.012 0.016* 0.013 0.016 0.018** 0.011
(2.145) (0.947) (2.628) (0.384) (0.600) (1.828) (1.423) (0.820) (1.973) (0.685)
Roa 2.199*** 0.100 2.984*** 1.305** 0.021 2.007*** 1.865*** 1.669* 0.917 2.551***
(3.803) (0.100) (2.583) (2.327) (0.020) (3.537) (3.013) (1.936) (1.365) (3.316)
Loss 0.240** 0.084 0.576*** 0.087 0.114 0.158* 0.129 0.207* 0.011 0.349***
(2.539) (0.538) (2.588) (1.005) (0.695) (1.691) (1.190) (1.683) (0.101) (2.901)
Age 0.248*** 0.218*** 0.204** 0.247*** 0.201*** 0.250*** 0.258*** 0.153** 0.244*** 0.238***
(6.764) (3.726) (2.473) (7.335) (3.269) (6.943) (6.974) (2.521) (5.407) (5.495)
Top1 0.111 0.888*** 0.695* 0.308** 0.273 0.161 0.097 0.585*** 0.093 0.376**
(0.707) (3.775) (1.867) (2.188) (0.998) (1.080) (0.567) (2.797) (0.476) (2.087)
Seo 0.013 0.088 0.075 0.028 0.014 0.027 0.080 0.093 0.026 0.005
(0.235) (1.007) (0.567) (0.557) (0.145) (0.491) (1.397) (1.123) (0.391) (0.079)
Soe 0.116** 0.048 0.045 0.127*** 0.120 0.157*** 0.003 0.192***
(2.068) (0.612) (0.364) (2.580) (1.251) (3.022) (0.041) (3.075)
Constant 1.864*** 2.175*** 7.004*** 3.805*** 4.150*** 4.298*** 2.318*** 1.881*** 2.165*** 2.091***
(6.854) (5.933) (5.322) (7.290) (4.266) (7.589) (7.356) (5.311) (6.497) (6.395)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9379 3961 1910 11,430 3304 10,035 8452 4875 6670 6660
Wald Chi2 553.65 371.74 220.15 740.60 202.04 740.77 584.25 365.62 482.11 497.81
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.080 0.098 0.053 0.048 0.060 0.059 0.061 0.059 0.060
coefficient difference test of CSR P = 0.295 P = 0.106 P = 0.589 P = 0.071 P = 0.000
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368 P. Zheng, C. Ren / China Journal of Accounting Research 12 (2019) 357–377to 1 if a company belongs to a sensitive industry such as mining, manufacturing, power, heat, gas, and water
production and supply, and otherwise 0. Second, following Zhang et al. (2014), we adopt two variables—cus-
tomer distance (CP) and refinancing demand (Fseo)—to investigate the economic motivation. If a company
belongs to the textile, clothing, fur, food, beverage, or pharmaceutical industry, then the variable CP is equal
to 1, and otherwise 0. For refinancing demand, if the company has additional issuance or allotment in the fol-
lowing year, Fseo is 1, and otherwise 0. Third, due to their close relationship with the government, state-
owned enterprises are more likely to get preferential policies (Li and Zheng, 2016), whereas it is more difficult
for non-state-owned enterprises to obtain government resources. Thus, the motivation of rent-seeking from
the government through voluntary disclosure of CSR information is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises
(Godfrey, 2005; Zou, 2018). Therefore, non-state-owned enterprises are more inclined than state-owned enter-
prises to voluntarily disclose their CSR reports. Finally, the principal-agent theory suggests that the disclosure
of CSR information may be a tool to ‘‘whitewash” managerial misconduct. As the agent cost of managers is
one of the necessary conditions for the existence of this ‘‘cover-up effect” (Tian and Wang, 2017), we use the
variable of agency cost (Adm) to test the existence of managers’ self-interest motivation; the higher the agency
cost, the stronger the self-interest motivation of managers. Following Li (2014), agency cost is measured as theTable 7
Regression results for firm performance and information disclosure quality.
Variable Dependent variable: Auditor
Profit and loss Return on equity Institutional
ownership
Evaluation rating
loss Profit decline not
decline
low high pass/fail good/
excellent
CSR 0.764*** 0.388*** 0.478*** 0.333** 0.728** 0.349** 0.605*** 0.286**
(2.971) (3.414) (4.046) (2.563) (2.490) (2.487) (4.094) (2.058)
Size 0.353*** 0.144*** 0.184*** 0.155*** 0.208* 0.130* 0.204*** 0.130**
(3.773) (3.119) (3.809) (3.068) (1.880) (1.953) (3.529) (2.238)
Lev 0.251 0.240 0.230 0.250 0.208 0.325 0.259 0.055
(0.489) (0.930) (0.877) (0.897) (0.345) (0.948) (0.832) (0.159)
Growth 0.058 0.039 0.097* 0.032 0.132 0.114* 0.057 0.042
(0.336) (1.258) (1.656) (0.857) (1.027) (1.951) (1.279) (0.980)
Roa 1.677 1.641* 2.247*** 0.007
(1.132) (1.691) (2.813) (0.008)
Rev 0.770 0.197 0.283 0.178 0.502 0.408 0.513 0.036
(0.781) (0.479) (0.634) (0.382) (0.494) (0.805) (0.994) (0.065)
Inv 0.285 0.291 0.028 0.490 0.583 0.724 0.007 0.471
(0.441) (0.880) (0.081) (1.351) (0.773) (1.567) (0.016) (1.116)
Curr 0.015 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.019
(0.312) (0.941) (0.463) (0.945) (0.053) (0.111) (0.451) (1.049)
Age 0.435*** 0.217*** 0.248*** 0.238*** 0.286* 0.166** 0.228*** 0.283***
(2.683) (3.714) (4.041) (3.354) (1.870) (2.205) (3.332) (3.446)
Top1 0.568 0.201 0.025 0.507* 0.363 0.137 0.385 0.806**
(0.934) (0.754) (0.088) (1.697) (0.580) (0.403) (1.180) (2.289)
Seo 0.444** 0.020 0.009 0.047 0.129 0.047 0.160** 0.111*
(2.565) (0.419) (0.143) (0.696) (0.841) (0.805) (2.480) (1.780)
Soe 0.162 0.076 0.124 0.057 0.069 0.042 0.138 0.050
(0.874) (0.788) (1.214) (0.547) (0.301) (0.327) (1.083) (0.435)
Constant 7.767*** 3.856*** 4.555*** 4.009*** 5.244** 4.289*** 5.323*** 3.071**
(4.012) (3.984) (4.520) (3.761) (2.300) (3.095) (4.380) (2.544)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1210 12,127 7118 6218 1123 7655 6598 6733
Wald Chi2 108.83 434.53 361.17 282.41 126.50 261.94 346.89 220.12
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.052 0.061 0.055 0.116 0.051 0.072 0.048
Coefficient difference test of
CSR
P = 0.02 P = 0.07 P = 0.00 P = 0.05
P. Zheng, C. Ren / China Journal of Accounting Research 12 (2019) 357–377 369ratio of management expenses to revenue. If the ratio is larger than the median of the sample, Adm is equal to
1, and otherwise 0.
Based on the above analysis, Table 6 reports the regression results for the disclosure motivations subsam-
ples discussed above. The regression coefficients of CSR in column (1) are smaller than that in column (2), but
there is no significant difference, suggesting that when voluntary CSR disclosure is driven by the legitimacy
motivation, its effect on the demand for high-quality auditing is limited, perhaps because the legitimacy moti-
vation cannot guarantee the disclosure level of CSR information. To reduce the risk of auditors’ delivering
negative signals to stakeholders, these enterprises may have a weak demand for high quality audits. There
are no significant differences in the regression coefficients of CSR between columns (3) and (4), or between
columns (5) and (6), indicating that economic motivations do not significantly affect the relationship between
voluntary CSR disclosure and independent auditing demand, perhaps because Chinese listed companies can’t
make scientific decisions when they determine the disclosure level of CSR information in practice, the signif-
icant impact of customer proximity on CSR remains at the decision-making level of whether to disclose CSR
reports, but not at the actual disclosure level of CSR information (Zhang et al., 2014). The supervision mech-
anism proposed by China’s regulatory authorities, that ‘‘the refinancing of listed companies will be linked to
the fulfillment of social responsibility”, has not worked effectively, thus listed companies do not feel the needTable 8
Regression results for the disclosure level of CSR information.
Variable Dependent variable: Auditor
Score 0.030***
(4.328)
Med_score 0.494***
(4.090)
Mea_score 0.583***
(4.778)
Size 0.404*** 0.441*** 0.429***
(4.958) (5.529) (5.360)
Lev 0.394 0.466 0.480
(0.790) (0.933) (0.961)
Growth 0.015 0.013 0.026
(0.123) (0.104) (0.213)
Rev 1.028 0.934 0.954
(1.429) (1.308) (1.334)
Inv 0.003 0.004 0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.013)
Curr 0.036 0.040 0.039
(1.426) (1.600) (1.558)
Roa 0.426 0.177 0.029
(0.275) (0.114) (0.019)
Loss 0.033 0.050 0.087
(0.129) (0.195) (0.333)
Age 0.280*** 0.303*** 0.297***
(2.910) (3.135) (3.090)
Top1 0.206 0.164 0.146
(0.547) (0.436) (0.387)
Seo 0.195 0.188 0.189
(1.411) (1.363) (1.371)
Soe 0.256* 0.259* 0.252*
(1.903) (1.919) (1.857)
Constant 11.960*** 11.351*** 11.005***
(6.793) (6.375) (6.152)
Year Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
N 1580 1580 1580
Wald Chi2 161.05 158.29 164.69
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.093 0.096
370 P. Zheng, C. Ren / China Journal of Accounting Research 12 (2019) 357–377to improve the disclosure level of CSR information when they have refinancing motivation (Zhang et al.,
2012). Generally, high-quality auditing is more likely to discover the true ‘‘information content” of CSR
reports. Therefore, to reduce the risk of conveying bad signals to stakeholders, companies in close contact with
customers and companies with refinancing needs tend to choose low-quality audits when they voluntarily dis-
close CSR reports.
Comparisons of the regression coefficients of CSR between columns (7) and (8) and between columns (9)
and (10) shows that (7) and (9) are significantly larger than (8) and (10) correspondingly, which means the
relationship between voluntary CSR disclosure and independent audit demands is significantly influenced
by political motivations and managerial self-interest motivation. Specifically, the disclosure of CSR informa-
tion may allow managers to conceal misconduct (Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Zou, 2018). For managers,
voluntary CSR disclosure can reduce the demand for high-quality audits and thus reduce the possibility that
auditors will convey to stakeholders bad signals that could damage the enterprises’ or their own reputation. As
a resource of great value, political connections can be exploited by managers conducting rent-seeking activi-
ties, and the transactions that can help obtain various benefits from government officials are often in a ‘‘grey
zone” of activities forbidden by the formal system (Tang et al., 2011). Obviously, managers do not want sen-
sitive information related to rent-seeking activities to be made public and become the focus of attention from
external investors and regulators. As auditing is an external supervision mechanism, political connections will
weaken the demand for high-quality audits (Du and Zhou, 2010).
5.2. Firm performance and information disclosure quality
As CSR disclosure can allow managers to cover up inadequate profitability or other bad news, it can be
expected that firm performance and information disclosure quality may have different effects on the relation-
ship between CSR disclosure and audit demand. Therefore, we further divide the sample into subsamples
based on firm performance and information disclosure quality. Specifically, to examine firm performance,
the sample is divided into subsamples of enterprises with and without operational losses and into subsamples
of enterprises with declining or not declining business operations. If the net profit of an enterprise is less than
0, it is classified as operating at a loss; if the rate of return on common stockholders’ equity is lower than in the
previous year, the firm is classified as having performance declines. Columns 2–5 of Table 7 show that com-
pared with companies that do not disclose CSR information, companies that make voluntary CSR disclosures
are more inclined to select ‘‘small” accounting firms for auditing when their business is operating at a loss or
firm performance is declining. To examine information disclosure quality, we create subsamples based on
institutional ownership and on the evaluation of information disclosure. Previous studies indicate that enter-
prises with high institutional ownership have relatively high quality information disclosure (Velury and
Jenkins, 2006; Gao and Zhang, 2008). In this sample, if the percentage of institutional ownership of an enter-
prise is higher than the sample median, we assume that the quality of information disclosure is high. The Shen-
zhen Stock Exchange grades the information disclosure quality of enterprises as excellent, good, pass, or fail.
Following Yi et al. (2010), this study treats grades of ‘‘good” or ‘‘excellent” as indicators of high quality of
information disclosure. As shown in columns 6–9 of Table 7, the preference of enterprises that voluntarily dis-
close CSR information for ‘‘small” audit firms is stronger in enterprises with low quality information
disclosure.
5.3. Disclosure level of CSR information
The previous section examines the influence of voluntary CSR disclosure on audit demand; however, as
China does not yet have clear provisions for the format and content of CSR disclosure reports, the level of
disclosure in CSR reports is uneven. Hence, we restrict the sample to enterprises that voluntarily disclose
CSR information to further test the effect of disclosure level on audit demand. Drawing on Huang and
Zhou (2017) and Chen et al. (2018), the RKS rating scores are used to measure the disclosure level of CSR
information. The higher the rating score, the higher the disclosure level. Specifically, we use two measures
of disclosure level. The first directly uses the rating scores (Score). The second is a dummy variable Med_score
(Mea_score) calculated from the sample median (mean) of the rating scores; if the score is less than the sample
Table 9
Regression results of models after PSM.
Variable Dependent variables
Auditor Infee Auditor
(1) (2) (3)
CSR 0.345*** 0.008 0.621***
(4.484) (0.413) (5.627)
Auditor 0.107***
(5.539)
CSR*Auditor 0.080***
(2.975)
Hmkt 0.503***
(4.393)
CSR*Hmkt 0.617***
(3.960)
Size 0.297*** 0.328*** 0.271***
(5.682) (29.781) (5.110)
Lev 0.068 0.194*** 0.230
(0.208) (3.170) (0.688)
Growth 0.052 0.028*** 0.064
(0.876) (2.937) (1.075)
Rev 0.321 0.353*** 0.004
(0.662) (4.001) (0.009)
Inv 0.167 0.105 0.147
(0.448) (1.618) (0.389)
Curr 0.005 0.016*** 0.010
(0.293) (5.164) (0.542)
Roa 1.499 0.256 0.966
(1.367) (1.265) (0.856)
Loss 0.177 0.079** 0.161
(0.979) (2.373) (0.866)
Age 0.290*** 0.031** 0.268***
(4.359) (2.561) (3.962)
Top1 0.032 0.014 0.109
(0.121) (0.291) (0.410)
Seo 0.031 0.023 0.066
(0.310) (1.288) (0.659)
Soe 0.077 0.143*** 0.191**
(0.828) (8.460) (1.984)
Auditop 0.039
(0.744)
Sqsub 0.056***
(10.141)
Constant 6.552*** 6.497*** 6.611***
(5.550) (25.882) (5.468)
Year Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes
N 3106 3106 3106
Wald Chi2/F value 233.53 81.39 322.06
PseudoR2 /adjusted R2 0.064 0.539 0.090
P. Zheng, C. Ren / China Journal of Accounting Research 12 (2019) 357–377 371median (mean), Med_score (Mea_score) is equal to 1, and otherwise 0. The regression results, given in Table 8,
show that the regression coefficient of Score is significantly negative at the 1% level, and the regression coef-
ficients of Med_score (Mea_score) are significantly positive at the 1% level, indicating that among companies
that voluntarily disclose their CSR reports, lower disclosure levels increase the likelihood of ‘‘small” account-
ing firms being employed to conduct audits, perhaps because the disclosure of CSR information has a ‘‘cover-
up” effect. Compared with small accounting firms, big accounting firms devote more auditing resources to
CSR information because of their professional competence and their concerns for reputation loss, litigation
Table 10
Two stage least square regression with an instrumental variable.
variable Dependent variables
CSR Auditor Infee Auditor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean_pro 3.113***
(31.011)
P_CSR 0.915*** 0.160*** 0.598***
(9.615) (2.866) (6.092)
Auditor 0.126***
(14.420)
P_CSR*Auditor 0.209***
(3.558)
Hmkt 0.289***
(7.213)
P_CSR* Hmkt 1.222***
(3.888)
Size 0.362*** 0.237*** 0.326*** 0.163***
(19.801) (16.230) (69.618) (9.789)
Lev 0.437*** 0.507*** 0.165*** 0.307***
(3.766) (6.071) (6.689) (3.618)
Growth 0.099*** 0.063*** 0.015** 0.042**
(3.455) (3.371) (2.512) (2.227)
Rev 0.545*** 0.251* 0.363*** 0.089
(3.263) (1.930) (9.797) (0.680)
Inv 0.389*** 0.191* 0.122*** 0.279***
(3.862) (1.843) (4.231) (2.650)
Curr 0.003 0.005 0.013*** 0.005
(0.354) (1.013) (10.250) (0.976)
Roa 1.957*** 0.499 0.227** 0.264
(4.573) (1.638) (2.497) (0.850)
Loss 0.065 0.075 0.046*** 0.062
(0.995) (1.520) (3.224) (1.252)
Age 0.044* 0.092*** 0.002 0.081***
(1.800) (5.007) (0.332) (4.383)
Top1 0.254** 0.051 0.014 0.057
(2.331) (0.634) (0.620) (0.704)
Seo 0.061 0.082*** 0.058*** 0.085***
(1.612) (2.971) (7.155) (3.049)
Soe 0.073** 0.067** 0.163*** 0.006
(1.983) (2.502) (20.877) (0.216)
Auditop 0.131***
(6.052)
Sqsub 0.022***
(12.223)
Constant 9.256*** 4.554*** 6.564*** 3.197***
(24.220) (14.888) (69.428) (9.134)
Year No No No No
Industry No Yes Yes Yes
N 13,340 13,340 13,340 13,340
Wald Chi2/ F value 1342.79 491.51 341.1 791.53
Pseudo R2/ adjusted R2 0.158 0.027 0.495 0.044
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information content of CSR reports.
6. Robustness tests
To ensure the reliability of the main conclusions, this study carries out several robustness tests.
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Our sample of firms that voluntarily disclose CSR information may raise the problem of self-selection; that
is, companies may decide to disclose a CSR report only when the demand for a high-quality audit is not
strong. To mitigate the influence of the self-selection problem on our findings, the PSM method is adopted.
First, following Zhang et al. (2014), and Huang and Zhou (2017), we establish Model (4), which includes some
factors that are known to affect voluntary CSR disclosure. Second, we use a logit regression to compute ten-
dentiousness scores and then match them 1:1 to get two groups called ‘‘enterprises disclosing CSR reports vol-
untarily” and ‘‘enterprises not disclosing CSR reports”. Finally, we regress the matched samples using the
previous main models.CSRi;t ¼ a0 þ a1Sizei;t þ a2Levi;t þ a3Roai;t þ a4Top1i;t þ a5Duali;t þ a6Bsizei;t þ a7Mcgbi;t þ a8Soei;t
þ a9Seoi;t þ a10HHIi;t þ a11CP i;t þ a12Listplacei;t þ a13Senindi;t þ Year þ ei;t ð4Þwhere the definitions of CSR, Size, Lev, Roa, Top1, Seo, and Soe are the same as in Table 1. Dual is a variable
indicating whether the chairman and CEO are the same person; if so, it takes 1, and otherwise 0. Bsize, an
indicator of the size of the board of directors, equals the number of directors. Mcgb indicates managers’ own-
ership at the end of year. HHI is the product market competition, which is based on the H. Findall index. CP
is the customer proximity, such that if the enterprise belongs to the textile, clothing, fur, food, beverage, or
pharmaceutical industry, it takes 1, and otherwise 0. Listplace is the dummy variable representing listing loca-
tion, such that if a company is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Listplace equals 1, and otherwise 0.
Senind is a dummy variable representing the industry’s sensitivity to social responsibility issues, such that if
the enterprise belongs to mining, manufacturing, power, heat, gas, or water production and supply, it is 1,
and otherwise 0.
Table 9 reports the regression results for the matched samples. The regression coefficient of CSR is signif-
icantly positive at the 1% level (column (1)), and the interaction term CSR  Auditor is also significantly pos-
itive at the 1% level (column (2)). These results indicate that companies that voluntarily disclose CSR tend to
select small accounting firms for audits and pay them higher audit fees than companies that do not disclose
their CSR reports. The regression coefficient of the interaction term CSR  Hmkt is signficantly negative
at the 1% level (column (3)), which suggests that a good institutional environment can effectively weaken
the positive correlation between voluntary CSR disclosure and the tendency to choose ‘‘small” accounting
firms. The above regression results are consistent with our main findings, which further verifies all three
hypotheses.
6.2. Instrumental variable (IV)
To avoid any potential endogeneity problems in the above findings, this study uses an instrumental variable
to control. Following Feng et al. (2016), the mean of the voluntary CSR disclosure of enterprises in the same
region in the same year (Mean_pro) is taken as the instrumental variable indicating whether enterprises will
voluntarily disclose CSR activities in the current period. We argue that the companies in the same region (the
same province where a company is registered) share an external environment, so their CSRs are to some extent
correlated. However, the disclosure decisions of other companies in the same region should not affect the focal
company’s independent audit requirements; therefore, the variable Mean_pro satisfies the exogenous principle
of an instrumental variable. Table 10 shows the test results of a two stage least square (2SLS) test using the
instrumental variable. The regression coefficient of Mean_pro (column (1)) is significantly positive. The regres-
sion coefficient of P_CSR, which is represented whether or not enterprises voluntarily disclose their CSR
reports, equals the expected value. The P_CSR value is obtained from the first-stage regression. The regression
coefficient of the interaction term P_CSR  Auditor (column (3)) is significantly positive, and the regression
coefficient of the interaction term P_CSR  Hmkt (column (4)) is significantly negative. Overall, the results
support the main findings.
Table 11
Regression results of the robustness tests.
Variable Dependent variables
Auditor Infee Auditor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CSR 1.254*** 0.650*** 0.942*** 0.040 1.604***
(4.459) (8.501) (8.350) (1.591) (7.604)
Mkt 0.048***
(5.736)
CSR*Mkt 0.081***
(3.086)
Hmkt 0.463*** 0.481***
(11.221) (8.477)
CSR*Hmkt 0.589*** 1.034***
(5.178) (4.025)
Auditor 0.085***
(9.244)
CSR*Auditor 0.075**
(2.272)
Size 0.155*** 0.149*** 0.144*** 0.275*** 0.138***
(6.729) (6.419) (4.807) (46.551) (4.586)
Lev 0.076 0.008 0.319 0.076** 0.236
(0.546) (0.056) (1.608) (2.259) (1.177)
Growth 0.040 0.040 0.058** 0.003 0.050*
(1.315) (1.286) (1.991) (0.614) (1.750)
Rev 0.373* 0.496** 0.519 0.184*** 0.794**
(1.733) (2.302) (1.612) (3.391) (2.463)
Inv 0.276 0.249 0.022 0.162*** 0.090
(1.604) (1.437) (0.099) (4.748) (0.408)
Curr 0.008 0.009 0.024 0.014*** 0.022
(1.041) (1.195) (1.036) (4.194) (0.968)
Roa 1.530*** 1.405*** 1.698** 0.037 1.731**
(3.081) (2.807) (2.531) (0.324) (2.551)
loss 0.157* 0.151* 0.085 0.045*** 0.105
(1.940) (1.859) (0.808) (2.610) (0.985)
Age 0.219*** 0.214*** 0.351*** 0.014 0.285***
(7.079) (6.876) (5.678) (1.461) (4.544)
Top1 0.180 0.146 0.202 0.013 0.198
(1.374) (1.105) (1.064) (0.399) (1.033)
Seo 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.014 0.006
(0.486) (0.618) (0.260) (1.157) (0.083)
Soe 0.141*** 0.185*** 0.089 0.136*** 0.172***
(3.078) (3.994) (1.565) (14.283) (2.943)
Auditop 0.112***
(4.753)
Sqsub 0.063***
(18.153)
Constant 4.503*** 4.116*** 3.637*** 7.457*** 3.773***
(9.193) (8.397) (5.687) (62.564) (5.841)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,340 13,340 6816 6816 6816
Wald Chi2/F value 963.51 . 1101.87 597.93 169.7 671.12
Pseudo R2/adjusted R2 0.060 0.068 0.073 0.521 0.084
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We also examine how using an alternate measure of institutional environment affects Hypothesis 3. Specif-
ically, we directly use the annual marketization index (Mkt) to measure institutional environment; a higher
index number indicates a better institutional environment. We rerun the regression, and the results are listed
in column (1) of Table 11. We also create a third measure of institutional environment: we make the marke-
tization index in 2011 and subsequent years directly equal to the previous year’s value, and then construct a
dummy variable of institutional environment (Hmkt), where if the index is larger than the sample median,
Hmkt is equal to 1, and otherwise 0. We rerun the regression using this alternate measurement and the results
are reported in column (2) of Table 11.
In another robustness test, we use different regression samples. To further examine the influence of volun-
tary CSR disclosure on independent audit demand, we limit our sample to enterprises that either voluntarily
disclosed their CSR activities in every year of the nine-year sample period or did not disclose their CSR activ-
ities in any of the nine years. The regression results are listed in columns (3)–(5) of Table 11. Consistent with
the results reported above, we find that enterprises that voluntarily disclose their CSR activities prefer ‘‘small”
accounting firms for audits and are willing to pay higher audit fees, but a good institutional environment can
effectively restrain this preference. These robustness tests further support our hypotheses.
7. Conclusions and implications
In recent years, due to crises that have exposed a lack of food safety, environmental pollution, and safety
production accidents, the public has begun to demand that enterprises recognize their social responsibilities.
Since China issued policies related to social responsibility, enterprises have gradually realized the importance
of social responsibility for business development. Since 2008, the number of enterprises disclosing CSR reports
has increased each year, as has the number of voluntary disclosures. CSR reports provide important non-
financial information, which can play a supplementary role in audits. This study uses a sample of listed com-
panies from the 2008 to 2016 period to examine the relationship between voluntary CSR disclosure and inde-
pendent audit demand, and the effects of institutional environment on this relationship. Our conclusions can
be summarized as follows. (1) The demand for high-quality auditing is weaker in enterprises that voluntarily
disclose their CSR reports; that is, such enterprises are more inclined to employ small accounting firms for
auditing services and to pay them higher audit fees. (2) As the regional institutional environment improves,
the preference for small accounting firms is effectively restrained. (3) The relationship between voluntary
CSR disclosure and independent audit demand is influenced by the disclosure motivations. Specifically, polit-
ical motivation and managers’ self-interest motivation strengthen the preference for ‘‘small” firms, but legit-
imate motivations and economic motivations have no significant impact on the focal relationship. (4) The
business performance and information disclosure quality of enterprises also have an impact on the focal rela-
tionship. Specifically, the preference for ‘‘small” accounting firms is stronger in enterprises with poor perfor-
mance or low quality of information disclosure. (5) Among enterprises that voluntarily disclose their CSR
reports, lower levels of disclosure are associated with stronger preferences for ‘‘small” accounting firms.
The main conclusions of this study are unchanged by a series of robustness tests.
China currently has a transition economy, and a system for supervising CSR is currently being constructed
by the relevant government departments. Therefore, this study’s findings make important contributions to the
understanding of the economic consequences of voluntary CSR disclosure, its influence on independent audit
demand, and how institutional environment affects micro-enterprise decision-making. The study also provides
empirical evidence that will help government regulatory authorities to formulate targeted normative policies
related to CSR. One aspect of supervision that government regulators should strengthen is the supervision of
the performance and disclosure of CSR. In particular, they should severely crack down on pseudo-social
responsibility behaviors, improve the information quality of voluntary CSR disclosure, and promote CSR that
truly serves stakeholders. In addition, as a good institutional environment can play a positive role in helping
enterprises to make audit selection decisions, government departments should actively and steadily improve
the external institutional environment and focus on fostering and enhancing an environment that promotes
high-quality audits. This study also helps managers to realize the importance of the economic consequences
376 P. Zheng, C. Ren / China Journal of Accounting Research 12 (2019) 357–377of social responsibility activities. To fully exploiting the usefulness of CSR information, they need to
strengthen the motivation and content of CSR reports and promote the overall improvement of CSR disclo-
sure quality.
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